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Abstract: This article considers a transition toward European monetary union that combines
increased substitution of currencies and greater monetary, financial, and fiscal policy
coordination. It explores how such a transition would affect national inflation and interest rates
and required reserve ratios when governments depend in part on seigniorage funding for public
expenditures. We find that greater coordination of policies would lead to lower inflation and
interest rates but higher reserve-requirement ratios. Because higher reserve-requirement ratios
could place European banks at a competitive disadvantage, we conclude that the interaction
between reserve requirements and seigniorage concerns makes it less likely that the gradualist
approach of the Maastricht treaty is a sustainable means of transition to European union.

Introduction
Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, most nations of Western
Europe are committed to an eventual evolution toward greater harmonization of monetary and
financial policies, if not toward an ultimate currency union.1 Events of recent years have cast
some doubt on how quickly European monetary and financial integration may progress, but there
is clear commitment to the Treaty’s basic intention on the part of participating nations. The
essential thrust seems to be that participating nations gradually will undertake a transition toward
increased integration, coupled with a greater degree of coordination of monetary, financial, and
fiscal policies.2
As noted by several authors (for instance, Aizenman, 1992, Canzoneri and Rogers, 1990;
Gros, 1993; Sibert, 1994, one of the key issues complicating the task of integrating and/or
unifying the monetary and financial systems of Europe is balancing the goal of
integration/unification with the potential need for seigniorage as a source of public revenues. All
European nations have depended to some extent on seigniorage taxes to fund public
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expenditures (see Gros, 1993). As Drazen (1989) has emphasized, an immediate implication is
that bank reserve requirements, which influence the size of the monetary base and,
consequently, the level of seigniorage, play a key role in balancing the objectives of
integration/unification vis-à-vis seigniorage collection. Although there is a sizable literature
assessing the proper role of reserve requirements (recent contributions include Baltensperger,
1982; Brock, 1989; Horrigan, 1988; Romer, 1985) as an instrument of monetary and financial
policy, surprisingly little attention has been given to the important role that reserve requirements
must play in the transition to a more integrated European monetary and financial system. One
exception to this observation is Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), who extend Romer’s framework
to a two-country setting and conclude that a regulatory relaxation permitting cross-country
deposit holdings tends to lead to increases in inflation rates and reductions in required reserve
ratios.
In this article, we analyze the optimal determination of reserve requirements set by
governments of interdependent nations in which there already are cross-country holdings of
currencies and bank deposits and in which governments depend in part on seigniorage funding
for public expenditures. The government in each nation derives seigniorage revenues from
issuing high-powered money in the form of currency and bank reserves, and the magnitude of
reserves is determined in part by required reserve ratios set by the nation’s monetary authority.
The governmental authorities also set nominal interest rates. Consequently, each government
possesses two monetary policy instruments, a required reserve ratio and an interest rate, and a
fiscal instrument in the form of explicit taxes. Each government can use these three instruments
in an effort to maximize its nation’s welfare. The governments may coordinate their settings of
neither monetary instrument (pure Nash behavior), the interest rate and tax rate only (a stylized
“EMS” -type environment of partial coordination), or both monetary instruments and the tax rate
(full coordination).
Our key conclusions are as follows. First, policy coordination in the form of an EMS
arrangement with cooperative setting of interest (and inflation) rates but without coordination of
reserve requirements leads to a reduction of interest (and inflation) rates in both nations. Such
coordination, however, leads to increases in the optimal required reserve ratios in each nation.
The reason is that reductions in both nations’ nominal interest (and inflation) rates increase
welfare, and coordinated determination of interest rates internalizes this fact and induces
reductions in the interest-rate choices of the governmental authorities. But interest (inflation)-rate
reductions cause reductions in seigniorage revenues accruing to each nation’s government. This
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gives each policy maker an incentive to increase its reserve-requirement ratio, ceteris paribus, in
an effort to offset some of the seigniorage loss caused by the lower coordinated interest-rate
choices.
Second, if the choices of both interest rates and required reserve ratios are coordinated,
then the governments together recognize the joint seigniorage loss that they experience by
reducing interest rates. Hence, with coordination of both instruments, the policy makers, under
most circumstances, will increase required reserve ratios even further, as compared with a
situation of interest-rate coordination only, which also permits them to reduce interest (and
inflation) rates by a larger amount. Indeed, an implication of our framework is that purely insular
policy making yields lower reserve requirement ratios as compared with a fully coordinated
regime, even if the latter environment includes fully substitutable currencies. Therefore, our
overall result is that greater coordination of monetary and financial policies leads to lower interest
and inflation rates but higher reserve requirements.
Of course, European nations are not symmetrically structured. They have different
reserve requirement ratios, and they rely to differing extents upon seigniorage revenues as
sources of funding for public spending. Nevertheless, we argue that our results indicate that,
following the present evolutionary period of market and regulatory integration within Europe, any
transition that is characterized by increased policy coordination is likely to witness pressures for
higher average required reserve ratios. Therefore, even though interest and inflation rates may
be reduced by such coordination efforts, average reserve taxes on European banks and their
depositors are likely to increase during any lengthy transition period leading up to a common
currency union. Consequently, increased policy coordination and monetary and financial
integration could make the European banking system less competitive with others around the
world. This feature of a gradualist transition toward EMU makes such an approach arguably less
sustainable, as compared with the immediate adoption of full monetary union that some
observers have advocated.
Our conclusions are derived from a two-country model that is described and solved in the
following section. In section 3, we use the model to determine and compare the optimal
instrument choices of governmental authorities in noncoordination, partial-coordination, and
full-coordination settings. Then, in section 4, we interpret the meaning of our theoretical results
for European countries as they contemplate further efforts to integrate their markets and
coordinate their monetary policies. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary and a discussion of
remaining issues.
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2. A model of currency and deposit substitution with reserve requirements
The model that follows is a direct extension of Canzoneri and Diba (1992) (for an
extension of the model in another interesting direction, see Canzoneri and Diba, 1993). There
are two countries and a single, homogeneous good. Each country issues its own currency. In
addition-and this is our key extension of the Canzoneri-Diba framework-each country has a
banking system in which depository institutions issue deposits denominated in the home
currency. Agents in each country can hold currency and bank deposits issued by the
governments and banking systems of both nations.
2. 1. Basic structure of the model
Each nation is composed of identical, infinitely lived households with utility functions,
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where ! and !  are home and foreign income endowments, # and #  are lump-sum taxes

imposed by the nations’ governments, ( and (  are the real returns on bonds issued by those

governments,  and   are the real quantities of bonds: demanded, $ and $ are the home

and foreign prices of the consumption good, and * and * are the real rates of return on
deposits issued by home and foreign banks.

There is only one good, and so the home currency price of foreign exchange is equal to
$ /$. We assume throughout that this exchange rate is flexible. Because agents in both
countries have identical preferences, and because governments in the model will aim to
maximize welfare, the countries in this model are symmetric.3 Consequently, in equilibrium, it will
always be the case ex post that $ = $ , so that the exchange rate is equal to unity. This implies
that in any policy regime which we might consider, the ex post equilibrium exchange rate must
equal unity even though the exchange rate floats endogenously ex ante.
First-order conditions for the home country’s households’ constrained utility
maximizations (those for foreign households are symmetric, and so we focus only on the
domestic solutions below) are given by
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Banks operate in competitive deposit markets in which, assuming costless banking for
5 Daniels & Van Hoose

simplicity, the nominal interest rate on deposits 5 is equal to the nominal bond rate multiplied
times one minus the required reserve ratio 6 (with 0 8 6 8 1):
5   1 " 6 9
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must hold at an optimum.
Following Canzoneri and Diba, the government budget constraints are given by
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and ?#  are tax collection costs, with 0 8 ?B 8 1 and ?"  0 and where @ and

@  denote the quantities of government bonds supplied. As an analytical simplification, we
assume that >  > and that !  !  , which preserves symmetry between the nations.
Seigniorage revenues @  @ 

are defined by
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where FG and IG are home and foreign nominal high-powered money supplies and 
and  are real quantities of high-powered moneys.5

2.2. Reserve requirements, seigniorage, and currency substitution
In this model, in contrast to that of Canzoneri and Diba, high-powered money consists of
both currency and required reserves. Part of the real home monetary base is held by home
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residents and is equal to 
to 

6  , and the remainder is held by foreign residents and is equal

6 . Consequently, the total real monetary base is equal to   

6 . Likewise, the foreign real monetary base is equal to   
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It follows that the discounted present values of seigniorage revenues earned by the two
governments are equal to
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where it has been assumed that initial (carried into time zero) real high-powered moneys are
equal to zero; that is, %&  %&  0. Ceteris paribus, real seigniorage revenues rise with
increases in required reserve ratios, but higher reserve requirements increase the reserve tax on
deposits and thereby can depress deposit demand.
To capture this effect, consider the following extended version of the Canzoneri-Diba
parameterization of currency substitution. The function  ,  ,  ,  ; ,  is assumed to take
the form
 ,  ,  ,  ; ,   "1/2 2K "  " 
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where 0 8  8 1 is a measure of ceteris paribus preferences of deposits relative to currency
and  M 0 is a measure of the degree of substitutability across national moneys. As 

increases in value, home and foreign moneys approach perfect substitutability internationally. As
 falls in value, deposits are more preferred to currency, holding other factors constant. The
satiation level of total real money balances K represents a ridge point for the utility function.
This utility function implies that currency and deposits are imperfect substitutes both
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within and between countries. Maximization of (9) yields the first-order conditions,
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Solving this system of first-order conditions yields currency and deposit demand functions:
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 %& . Under this utility specification,

asset demands depend negatively on their own opportunity costs and positively on the
opportunity costs of all other assets. Furthermore,  8  and  8  for any given interest

rate for 0 8 6 8 1 and 0 8  8 1. Thus, for these parameter values currency-deposit ratios are
less than unity in each country, which is consistent with real-world observation.

3. Optimal policymaking with and without international policy coordination
The basic goal of each nation’s government is to choose its interest rate, required reserve
ratio, and taxes to maximize the welfare of its nation. But there are three modes of policymaker
behavior that we consider. One is noncoordinated policymaking, in which each nation’s
government maximizes its country’s welfare, taking all the instrument choices of the other
government as given. Another is what we term “partial coordination,” in which authorities
coordinate their optimal settings of their interest rates and taxes but noncooperatively determine
their reserve requirement ratios. The third is full coordination, in which both policy makers
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cooperate in setting all monetary and fiscal instruments.6
3. 1. Noncoordinated policy making
With noncoordinated policy making, the domestic government chooses its interest rate,
required reserve ratio, and taxes to maximize (1a), where the discounted present value of
domestic consumption is
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where X and X are as defined in (8). Given the form of the seigniorage relationship in (8a),
the domestic intertemporal government budget constraint is, from (6a), given by
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Therefore, the domestic authority’s problem is to maximize (1a) in light of (12a), subject
to (13a) and to the structure of the model.
The foreign authority behaves analogously, maximizing (1 b) given the discounted
present value of foreign consumption,
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and subject to the foreign intertemporal government budget constraint,
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Nevertheless, because the nations are symmetric, their governments will make identical
choices, and this symmetry considerably simplifies solving the constrained, noncoordinated
optimal policy problems. The solutions for the required reserve ratios, interest rates, and, from
(5), inflation rates are given by:7
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Substitution of the definitions of Y, , and Z into equations (14) yields [6 . /[ 8 0,

[ . /[ 8 0, and [; . /[ 8 0. In addition, it is straightforward to show that as  \ ∞,  . \

0 and ; . \ " , which is the Friedman rule. Hence, as in Canzoneri and Diba, the Friedman

rule arises when currencies are completely substitutable for one another: The optimal nominal
interest rate approaches its minimum value of zero, so that the optimal inflation rate with
competing currencies is deflation at the rate of time preference, and the nations rely on explicit
taxes to fund expenditures.
At the same time, the optimal required reserve ratio falls with an increase in the degree of
currency substitution. One reason for this result is that as currency substitution increases,
leaving reserve requirements unchanged would place an artificial constraint on the ability to shift
funds among competing assets, which would constrain utility. Another is that with greater
substitutability of currencies, home agents are more willing to substitute foreign bank deposits for
home deposits if the home required reserve ratio exceeds the foreign required reserve ratio. This
induces competition between policymakers to reduce reserve requirements. Note, however, that
governments do not eliminate reserve requirements in the limiting case of complete currency
substitution; each instead sets its required reserve ratio at uncoordinated values that balance the
relative preferences of home and foreign currencies and deposits so as to maximize the utility of
the representative citizens of its nations.
3.2. Partial coordination
As the European Union currently is constituted, policy coordination at best could be
described as “partial.” The settings of reserve-requirement ratios are not coordinated. Increased
“harmonization” of fiscal instruments still is largely a matter of discussion, and full fiscal
coordination remains a stated goal rather than even an approximation to reality. Only through the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) has any real coordination, albeit limited, been achieved. In
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our model, the ERM would approximate the coordination of interest-rate choices. If fiscal
coordination were added, then the resulting EMS/fiscal-coordination arrangement could be
regarded as a precursor to full European monetary and fiscal union.
Therefore, we approximate such an enhanced EMS-style coordination effort by solving
the following policy coordination problem. Policy makers in each nation choose their interest
rates and tax rates to maximize joint welfare (the sum of  and   ), but subject only to their
own government budget constraints. At the same time, they choose reserve-requirement ratios
only to maximize home welfare, and subject only to home budget constraints. Hence, the
domestic authority maximizes (1a), using (12a).8
The solutions to this respecified policy problem are as follows:
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where Y_ < 2Z " 1 Γ " Z " 1 Q and _ < 3Z " 2 Q.
In this case of partial coordination, it can be shown that the Friedman rule continues to
hold in the limit in which  \ ∞. Consequently, even though policymakers coordinate their
interest-rate choices, nominal interest rates are driven to zero. This contrasts with Canzoneri and
Diba's interest-rate-coordination result, in which the Friedman rule fails to hold because the
existence of marginal tax collection costs makes seigniorage part of the optimal tax package.
The reason that Canzoneri and Diba's result does not hold in our partial-coordination case is that
even though policymakers coordinate their interest-rate choices, they continue to compete
through their required reserve ratio settings, taking into account their individual budget
constraints. Therefore, in the limiting case of pure currency competition, they earn no
seigniorage revenues. In addition, [6 ^ /[ 8 0, [ ^ /[ 8 0, and [; ^ /[ 8 0, so that increased
currency substitution reduces interest and inflation rates and the optimal reserve-requirement
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15c

ratios. The latter results follow for the same basic reasons discussed in the previous case.
3.3. Full coordination
As a prelude to ultimate European monetary union (EMU), the Treaty on European Union
outlines a gradual movement toward coordination of monetary and fiscal policy instruments but
retention of separate national currencies. At the end of such a transition phase, the Treaty
specifies an umbrella European System of Central Banks and sufficient monetary/financial
integration and policy coordination to permit a low-cost shift to a common currency and common
reserve requirements (see Article 19 of the Treaty). While this “gradualist” approach to EMU has
drawbacks (see De Grauwe, 1994), it represents the transitional framework to which the political
institutions of the European union presently are committed.
To model the end result of such a transition in the period immediately preceding the
formation of a true European common-currency union, we follow Canzoneri and Diba by
considering the outcome as the solution of a “world planner’s” problem of choosing all the policy
instruments to maximize joint welfare, subject to both government budget constraints
simultaneously. This optimization problem yields the following solutions for required reserve
ratios, nominal interest rates, and inflation rates:
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where YB < Γ " Q and B < 2Q. Again, it can be shown that [6 e /[ 8 0, [ e /[ 8 0, and [; e /
[ 8 0, so that increased currency competition leads to lower interest and inflation rates as well
as reduced required reserve ratios. In this case, however, the achievement of completely
substitutable currencies does not lead to the Friedman rule for optimal inflation. The reason, as
in Canzoneri and Diba, is that, in the presence of marginal tax collection costs, some reliance on
seigniorage by the cooperative authorities is optimal, and so currency competition does not yield
the Friedman rule in which seigniorage is driven to zero.
12 Daniels & Van Hoose

The result that optimal required reserve ratios decline with greater currency substitution
may seem counterintuitive given that coordination removes the competition between the
governments in setting their reserve-requirement ratios. As discussed in subsection 3.1, without
coordination, interest and inflation rates are driven to zero, which then mitigates the ability to
collect seigniorage taxes as a means of raising revenues in the presence of costs in raising
explicit taxes. Then each government chooses the optimal reserve-requirement ratio solely to
maximize its citizens’ utilities by inducing the optimal portfolios of differentiated assets. But
coordination permits the governments to internalize the tradeoff between meeting seigniorage
requirements in the presence of tax collection costs and inducing optimal portfolio selection
among imperfectly substitutable assets. As a result, each , government chooses positive interest
and inflation rates even if there is complete currency substitution, and it can capture positive
seigniorage revenues through lower required reserve ratios that provide agents incentives to
balance their portfolios optimally in light of its nonzero interest-and inflation-rate choices.
3.4. Regime switching and increased European integration
What happens to policy choices and to inflation rates with increased international policy
coordination? To answer this question, we begin with ceteris paribus comparisons of the
solutions in (14), (15), and (16). The results of these comparisons are summarized as follows:
e

^

6 M 6 M 6.,
e

^

 8  8 .,

17a
17b

and
e

^

; 8 ; 8 ;.,

17c

with , , and ?B assumed equal across regimes. Note that the comparison of the partial
coordination case to the noncoordinated case is unambiguous for all ranges of parameter values.
The indicated inequalities relating the partial coordination case to the fully coordinated case,
however, require an assumption that  is relatively small in value and that ?B is significantly
different from zero. Therefore, as long as deposits are strongly preferred to currency and/or
marginal tax collection costs are fairly large, moving from a regime of uncoordinated policy
making to one in which all instruments except reserve requirements are coordinated would lead
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to lower interest and inflation rates but higher reserve requirements.9
To understand these results, consider first the comparison between the noncoordinated
and partial-coordination cases. When the policy makers coordinate their interest-rate choices,
they internalize the international externalities that they ignore, when they do not cooperate, and
so coordination leads to lower interest rates under partial coordination as compared with the
noncooperative equilibrium (except at the limit of complete currency substitution). But reductions
in interest and inflation rates reduce seigniorage, thereby requiring offsetting (noncoordinated)
increases in required reserve ratios in an effort to partially offset the seigniorage loss.
If policy makers move to full coordination, then they internalize the mutual incentive to
raise reserve requirements that results from reduced interest rates. Hence, as long as deposits
are sufficiently preferred to currency, and/or marginal tax collection costs are sufficiently large
to internalize policy makers’ reliance on seigniorage, the policy makers increase
reserve-requirement ratios even more when they coordinate all policy choices.
Of course, the transition to EMU, if successful, should also entail increased integration of
money and financial markets in European nations. One possible outcome of increased
integration could be greater currency substitution. The ceteris paribus comparisons in (17)
abstract from increases in  that might accompany regime switches that would occur under a
gradualist approach to EMU. Nevertheless, higher substitutability of currencies leads to lower
interest and inflation rates and lower required reserve ratios in all regimes, as discussed in the
previous subsections. Would greater currency substitution−a rise in the value of −improve the
prospects for lower required reserve ratios with coordinated policy making? To evaluate this
issue, we conduct one more comparison. Under noncoordinated policy making, the optimal
reserve ratio settings for a finite value of  are given by (14a). We compare these values with
the optimal reserve ratio settings under full coordination plus the assumption of completely
substitutable currencies,  \ ∞. Using the solutions for 6
e

e

e

and 6

e

in (16a), we find that

6 h.i\  6 h.i\  . Hence, full currency substitution constrains the policy makers to set
required reserve ratios consistent with agents’ allocation preferences of currency and deposits in
e

e

their asset portfolios. This comparison yields 6 . 8 6g h.i\ and 6 . 8 6 h.i\ for all parameter
values.
The implication of this result is that full policy coordination by separate national authorities
generates higher reserve requirements, even if coordination is accomplished by increased
currency substitution. The downward pressure on required reserve ratios induced by greater
currency substitution is not sufficient to offset the internalization of the seigniorage motive for
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raising reserve requirements that policy coordination produces. Hence, coordinating authorities
unambiguously have an incentive to raise required reserve ratios, even in the face of a greater
degree of currency substitution.

4. Implications for European integration/unification
Because our stylized model assumes symmetry across nations, its implications for
present-day Europe must be interpreted with care. For instance, our conclusion that increased
policy coordination coupled with greater currency substitution initially would lead to adoption of
higher reserve requirements seems to fly in the face of recent efforts of “outlying” European
nations such as Portugal to align their reserve-requirement ratios with the lower
reserve-requirement ratios prevailing elsewhere in Europe.10 But we would argue that our
model’s implications should be most applicable to a Europe that emerges after such fundamental
harmonization efforts have been completed. That is, after southern nations such as Portugal
have brought their degrees of dependence on seigniorage and their reserve requirements into
greater general alignment, then the general average initial trends for Europe as a whole that our
model predicts would follow in the absence of significantly greater currency substitution.
Hence, the prediction of our model is that the general trend in Europe, if the gradualist
approach to an EMU transition is adopted, would be as follows. Barring shocks not accounted
for by our model, the EMU transition outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht would yield lower
interest rates, lower inflation rates, and higher required reserve ratios. Consequently, by the
time that Europe would find itself poised for the final step of adopting a common currency and a
unified banking system with common reserve requirements, its nations on average would have
lower interest and inflation rates and higher reserve ratios than during the initial phases of the
proposed transition.
Greater currency substitution certainly would dampen the incentive for coordination
European authorities to increase reserve requirement ratios under policy coordination. There is
little evidence, however, that efforts to integrate European economies have substantially
increased the substitutability of European currencies (for instance, see Mizen and Pentecost’s
1994 analysis of the continuing lack of substitutability of the pound for other European
currencies). Our analysis indicates that even if currency substitution were to accelerate, full
policy coordination among separate European nationstates would result in reserve
requirements higher than those in a noncoordinated regime with a lower degree of currency
substitution.
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This conclusion leads naturally to arguments against the Treaty’s gradualist approach to
EMU. If a gradual transition with multiple currencies would, as our model predicts, produce
higher European reserve requirements, the result could be a reduction in the ability of the
European banking system to compete with other banking systems outside the European Union.
Suppose that reserve ratios in existing common-currency systems of the world (for instance, in
the common-currency-based banking systems of the federal polities of the United States, Japan,
or even China) are lower than those that theoretically would tend to emerge by the end of a
gradual EMU transition. Then the transition path that we have modeled actually may be an
unstable path. It would imply a reduction of competitiveness of European banking that might not
be tolerated by European policy makers.11

5. Conclusion
Our basic conclusion is that greater European monetary and financial integration are,
when coupled with a transition to increased coordination of monetary and fiscal policymaking,
likely to lead naturally to lower interest rates, lower inflation rates, and higher required reserve
ratios. While lower interest and inflation rates are consistent with the expressed goals of
European union, higher reserve-requirement ratios are not. Yet, to the extent that seigniorage
remains a partial source for public funding in European nations and currency substitution
remains low, increased reserve requirements emerge as a likely outcome along a gradual
transition path to EMU, as outlined by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Because this
could place European banking at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the banking systems of
other nations, this conclusion calls into question whether the gradual transition envisioned by
the Maastricht Treaty is likely to be sustainable. Hence, our analysis adds weight to the
argument against the “gradualist” approach to EMU specified by the Treaty.
Of course, we have not explicitly modeled the interaction of the combined European
banking system with those of any other nations. Our two-country model of “Europe” takes the
rest of the world as “given.” A potentially interesting, albeit difficult, undertaking would be to
extend our model to a three-nation setting in which there is currency substitution across the
entire group but in which two nations decide to embark on a transition such as the one we have
outlined in this article.12 Such a broadened analysis would take into account feedback effects
across monetary and banking systems and thereby would resolve how the interaction between
one nation and a coalition of two other nations ultimately would evolve during a transition toward
currency union among the coalition partners. But such an extension lies beyond the bounds of
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this article.
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Notes
1. See the Treaty on European Union (1992) and the very helpful overview and analysis of
some of its key monetary policy implications in Fratianni, von Hagen, and Waller (1992).
2. For a recent overview of the issues entailed in developing gradual versus speedy transition
strategies for European union, see De Grauwe (1994).
3. This, of course, is an heroic assumption, given that reserve requirements and relative
degrees of dependence upon seigniorage revenues differ considerably across European
nations, as documented by Drazen (1989), Rovelli (1994), and Gros (1993). A potentially
interesting, albeit difficult, direction in which to extend this framework would be to
contemplate a more realistic environment with nations of different sizes and divergent public
finance characteristics.
4. Our assumption of a constant proportional tax collection cost parallels a similar approach by
Aizenman (1989), and it corresponds to the special case that Canzoneri and Diba (1992)
adopt in their own attempt to compare across policy regimes as we do in this article.
5. This is a cash-flow measure of seigniorage. See Gros (1989, 1993), Klein and Neumann
(1990), and Rovelli (1994) for useful discussions of alternative seigniorage concepts.
6. Of course, there are other iterations that could be considered, but we chose these to be of
greatest interest in light of current proposals for greater unity of policy making in Europe.
7. The manner in which these solutions are obtained and in which comparisons across regimes
are made is outlined in a separate appendix that is available from either author upon request.
8. Another possible version of “partial” coordination would be full coordination of both interest
rates and taxes in light of both nations’ household and government budget constraints but
noncoordination of reserve requirements in light of only home household and government
budget constraints. This would be an alternative hybrid of the uncoordinated and fully
coordinated cases that we also consider. But, in light of the incomplete nature of fiscal
coordination in Europe at present, we have chosen to consider partial tax coordination as the
case to emphasize in the text. This does not affect the qualitative nature of our final
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conclusions.
9. The reason that an ambiguity can exist for some parameter values is that ceteris paribus, a
higher required reserve ratio under full coordination, as compared to the case of partial
coordination, tends to increase seigniorage while potentially worsening the agents’ portfolio
allocations, given the interest rate. On the one hand, if  is close to unity, so that deposits
and currency are nearly equally weighed assets in the utility function, then a movement from
noncoordinated reserve-requirement i settings to full coordination of reserve requirements
would, for a given degree of currency substitution, induce the policy makers to reduce
reserve-requirement ratios. Coordinating policy makers would internalize the recognition that
higher reserve ratios would tend to induce agents who value currency and deposits nearly
equally to substitute currency for deposits. This would worsen the agents’ portfolio
allocations at coordinated interest-rate settings and inhibit the collection of the socially
optimal level of seigniorage. On the other hand, if marginal tax collection costs are miniscule,
then both policy makers internalize their reliance on explicit taxes when they coordinate fully,
inducing them to reduce required reserve ratios.
10. As von Hagen and Fratianni (1993) point out, such a harmonization of reserve requirement
ratios and other monetary and fiscal instruments is a necessary precursor to any attempt at a
Maastricht-style transition to EMU.
11. Another possible problem of higher reserve requirement ratios is that the resulting increase in
reserve taxes likely would lead to financial innovations, as agents seek to avoid such taxes.
This would complicate defining monetary aggregates. In our framework, in which policy
makers set interest rates, this is not difficulty for policy making, but it could become a problem
if policies instead were to center around monetary aggregates (see Canzoneri and Diba for
solutions of this type of model when monetary aggregates are policy instruments).
12. Such an approach might build, for instance, on the sort of stylized three-country framework
considered by Canzoneri and Henderson (1991, chapter 3).

References
Aizenman, Joshua (1992) “Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage,” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 24,61-71.
Baltensperger, Ernst (1992) “Reserve Requirements and Economic Stability,” Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 143, 205-215.
Bacchetta, Philippe and Ramon Caminal (1992) “Optimal Seigniorage and Financial
18 Daniels & Van Hoose

Liberalization,” Journal of International Money and Finance 11, 518-538.
Brock, Philip, (1989) “Reserve Requirements and the Inflation Tax,” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 21,106-121.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Behzad T. Diba (1993) “Currency Substitution and Exchange Rate
Volatility in the European Community,” Journal of International Economics 35, 351-365.
Canzoneri, Matthew B and Behzad T. Diba (1992) “The Inflation Discipline of Currency
Substitution,” European Economic Review 36, 827-845.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Dale W. Henderson (1991) Monetary Policy in Interdependent
Economies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Carol Ann Rogers (1990) “Is the European Community an Optimal
Currency Area? Optimal Taxation Versus the Cost of Multiple Currencies,” American
Economic Review 80, 419-433.
De Grauwe, Paul (1994) “Towards European Monetary Union without the EMS,” Economic
Policy 18, 147-185.
Drazen, Allan (1989) “Monetary Policy, Capital Controls, and Seigniorage in an Open
Economy.” In Marcello De Cecco and Alberto Giovannini (eds.), A Euorpean Central
Bank? Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Fratianni, Michele, Jürgen von Hagen, and Christopher J. Waller (1992) “The Maastricht Way
to EMU,” Essays in International Finance No. 187, Princeton University.
Friedman, Milton (1969) “The Optimum Quantity of Money.” In The Optimum Quantity of Money
and Other Essays. Chicago: Aldine.
Gros, Daniel (1993) “Seigniorage and EMU: The Fiscal Implications of Price Stability and
Financial Market Integration,” European Journal of Political Economy 9, 581-601.
Gros, Daniel (1989) “Seigniorage in the EC: The Implications of the EMS and Financial Market
Integration.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 89-7.
Horrigan, Brian R. (1988) “Are Reserve Requirements Relevant for Economic Stabilization?”
Journal of Monetary Economics 21, 97-105.
Klein, Martin and Manfred Neumann (1990) “Seigniorage: What Is It and Who Gets It?”
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 126, 205-221.
Mizen, Paul and Eric J. Pentecost (1994) “Evaluating the Empirical Evidence for Currency
Substitution: A Case Study of the Demand for Sterling in Europe,” Economic Journal 104,
1057-1069.
Romer, David (1985) “Financial Intermediation, Reserve Requirements, and Inside Money,”
19 Daniels & Van Hoose

Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 175-194.
Rovelli, Riccardo (1994) “Central Banking, Seigniorage, and the Financing of the Government.”
Paper presented at Conference on Central Bank Independence and Accountability,
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, March 4.
Sibert, Anne (1994) “The Allocation of Seigniorage in a Common Currency Area,” Journal of
International Economics 37, 111-122.
Treaty on European Union (1992).
von Hagen, Jürgen, and Michele Fratianni (1993) “The Transition to European Union and the
European Monetary Institute,” Economics and Politics 5, 167-186.

20 Daniels & Van Hoose

